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Abstract: 
 
Rapid urbanization is a fact of live even in the least developed countries 
(LDCs) where the lion’s share of the population presently lives in rural areas and will 
continue to do so for decades to come. At the turn of the millennium 75% of the 
LDCs’ population still lived in rural areas and 71% of the LDCs’ labor force was 
involved in agriculture. But even though the largest share of their population lives in 
rural areas and directly or indirectly derives their livelihoods from agriculture, a 
rapidly increasing share of the population migrates to urban centers in search for 
employment opportunities outside agriculture in industrial enterprises or the services 
sector The main purpose of this paper is to examine the causes and consequences -- in 
particular, the policy implications -- of the ongoing urbanization in the African LDCs. 
It is found that the employment opportunities in either rural or the urban sector are not 
growing adequately. This paper attempts to analyze the emerging trends and patterns 
of urbanization in the African LDCs within a dynamic dual-dual framework with a 
strong emphasis on rural-urban migration and the informal sectors. The analysis 
pinpoints, among other things, the need to build up productive capacities in order to 
create adequate employment and incomes for the rapidly growing population---
particularly in the urban areas. The development of productive capacities, which is a 
precondition for the creation of productive employment opportunities, is a central 
element of viable poverty reduction strategy for Bangladesh as well. Without 
significant poverty reduction it is impossible to think of viable urbanization on the 
basis of sustainable development criteria in this group of very African countries.   The 
donors, especially the OECD/ DAC countries, should provide the necessary financial 
backing for such a sustainable and equitable development strategy for Africa. It is 
necessary to reverse the trends in aid, and to provide a much larger share of aid for 
productive sector development, including the development of rural and urban areas, 
and the development of agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in line with the 
perspective of the dual-dual model. Although urban centers mostly host non-
agricultural industries, sustainable urbanization also strongly depends on what 
happens in the agricultural sectors. Productive employment opportunities in rural 
areas are important in order to combat an unsustainable migration from rural areas to 
urban centers, and productive employment opportunities in urban centers are essential 
to absorb the rapidly increasing labor force in the non-agricultural sector.  
 
Keywords: Urbanization, Africa, LDCs, Dual-Dual Model, Informal Sector, Poverty, 
Employment, Capabilities. 
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A. Introduction 
 
Rapid urbanization is a fact of live even in the least developed countries 
(LDCs)2 where the lion’s share of the population presently lives in rural areas and will 
continue to do so for decades to come. At the turn of the millennium 75% of the 
LDCs’ population was still living in rural areas and 71% of the LDCs’ labor force was 
involved in agriculture.3 But even though the largest share of their population 
continues to live in rural areas and directly or indirectly derive their livelihoods from 
agriculture, a rapidly increasing share of the population migrates to urban centers in 
search for employment opportunities outside agriculture in industrial enterprises or 
the services sector. Herrmann (2006) has pointed out that this decade 2000—2010 is a 
historical population and employment transition for the LDCs. For the first time in 
their history, the LDCs’ urban population grows faster than their rural population, but 
also the LDCs’ labor force in non-agriculture grows faster than their labor force in 
agriculture. These trends are driven by large LDCs in Asia, but they are also apparent 
in the LDCs in Africa. The LDCs which do not yet witness this transition are 
projected to do so in the decade 2010—2020.  
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the causes and consequences -- 
in particular, the policy implications -- of this ongoing urbanization for the LDCs. 
After briefly presenting the basic theoretical framework (section B), our paper will 
discuss the driving forces behind rapid urbanization in the LDCs (section C), effects 
of rapid urbanization on employment and poverty in the LDCs (section D), and 
implications for policies in LDCs (section E).   
 
 
B. The Theoretical Framework: 
A Dual-Dual Approach with Endogenous Migration 
 
As our basic theoretical framework we use what can be called a “dual-dual” 
model (Svejnar and Thorbecke 1980, 1982; Khan 1982 a, b, 1985, 1994, 1997, 2004 
a, b, 2006; Khan and Thorbecke 1988, 1989; Thorbecke, 1992, 1994; Thorbecke and 
                                                 
2 The group of LDCs currently includes 50 countries, 35 of which in Sub-Saharan Africa, 14 in Asia, 
and Haiti. The United Nations identifies these countries as least developed owing to a combination of 
three criteria, namely low per capita income, weak human resources and economic vulnerability. 
3 The labor force is the economically active population. 
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Santiago 1984; Thorbecke and Morrisson 1989). This corresponds to the 
characteristics of a developing economy with not only the traditional and modern 
sectors but also a kind of dualism within each of these sectors in terms of a formal/ 
informal dichotomy. More specifically, the process of development for economies 
moving from the least developed status to a higher level of development may modify 
the traditional sector further in the direction of a more market-based modern sector 
while the formal/ informal dichotomy is accentuated within both the sectors.  This is 
our most important move theoretically which is consistent with the stylized facts to be 
explained in our paper. Consequently, our approach reveals that even within the 
category of the least developed economies the theoretical possibility of the uneven 
development of the formal and informal sectors both in the urban and the rural areas 
can indeed be empirically confirmed as well. 
 Thus, in our theoretical framework, the coexistence and distribution of modern 
and informal type of activities in both rural and urban areas are taken as basic 
structural features of the economy in question. Our approach integrates poverty 
analysis with rural-urban movements in an economy wide setting by endogenizing 
both migration4 and intra-group income distributions and the nominal poverty line. 
Following this line of work leads to our being able to assess policy repercussions on 
both poverty specific to particular socioeconomic groups and on overall national 
poverty. 
 The starting point is the dual economy models of Lewis (1954) and Fei and 
Ranis (1964)5. These pioneering efforts, however, could not or did not take into 
account the co-presence of dualism within each sector of the two sector models of the 
dual economy. Erik Thorbecke first raised this issue in 1979 during the course of a 
National Science Foundation interdisciplinary project on technology and development 
and Svejnar and Thorbecke (1980, 1982) was the first published work on a prototype 
of dual-dual technology classification scheme. Khan (1982 a, b) and Khan (1985) 
were applications of this scheme to the energy and textiles sectors in South Korea. 
Khan (1983) raised the issue of linking technological dualism to poverty theoretically, 
following an early observation of Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976). Khan and Thorbecke 
(1988, 1989) were further applications of technological dualism to Indonesia. Khan 
                                                 
4 Within an overall trend towards rapid urbanization there can be migration in both directions. This can 
have important implications for poverty reduction policies, as Khan (2006) shows for South Asia. 
5 See Khan (1997) chapters 2 and 3 for a historical survey and a specific intertemporal dualistic model 
which is used to analyze the conflict between employment and output. 
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(1999) explores the connections between rural-urban dualism and migration and 
poverty in South Africa. Khan (2006) explores both rural-urban and reverse migration 
in a dual-dual model for South Asia.  
 In the current formulation, a rural/ urban dichotomy is combined with 
traditional/ modern technological dualism, leading to a fourfold classificatory 
scheme.6 A further extension of the early dual-economy models is that the rural 
economic sector does not only include agricultural activities, but also non-agricultural 
activities including various off-farm industries and services: 
 
1. Rural traditional is closely associated with informal activities, traditional 
labor-intensive technologies, family farms, food production for domestic 
consumption, and small-scale off-farm enterprises; 
2. Rural modern is associated with formal activities, capital-intensive 
technology, large-scale farming, cash and export crops, and large-scale off-
farm enterprises;  
3. Urban traditional is associated with informal activities, including petit 
services such as shoe-shining and the provision of other ad-hoc services on 
a non-contractual basis; 
4. Urban modern is associated with formal activities, with formal industrial 
enterprises, including textile factories with export-orientation, and modern 
services, such as banking, insurance, consultancy and telecommunications. 
 
Poverty analysis in this dual-dual approach can be integrated with migration 
and various shocks that are important features of the urbanization process in Africa. 
The empirical sections described below illustrate this. For a formalization of the dual-
dual model, the reader is referred to the appendix.7 
 
 
C. Driving forces of rapid urbanization 
 
                                                 
6 See Svejnar-Thorbecke (1980, 1982) and Khan (1983) for early developments. See also Khan (1997, 
2006) and Stifel-Thorbecke (2003). 
7 As is clear from the structure of the model, an empirical application utilizing the model fully and 
rigorously requires the use of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and relevant econometric estimates of 
elasticities etc. in order to calibrate the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. This is part of 
our future work on the subject. 
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Today, Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest rate of urbanization, albeit based 
on relative low levels of urbanization, compared with other continents (UN-
HABITAT 2007). Over the past decades the share of the urban population in the total 
population, as well as the share of the non-agricultural labor force in the total labor 
has persistently increased in the African LDCs, and that there is a close relationship 
between these two (chart 1). Table 1 shows that between 2000 and 2010 the urban 
population in the LDCs is projected to grow faster for the first time than the rural 
population. The former is projected to grow by 61 million (from 107 to 168), whereas 
the latter is expected to grow by 56 million (from 294 too 350). And the growth of the 
non-agricultural labor force is expected to exceed the growth of the agricultural labor 
force in 2010—2020 for the group of African LDCs. But although the group of 
African LDCs will experience this employment transition only in the decade to come, 
a number of African LDCs are already undergoing the employment transition 
(Herrmann 2006). These countries include Benin, Chad, the Central African Republic, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo and Zambia, as well as the small island states 
of Cape Verde, Maldives and Sao Tome and Principe.  
The growth of the urban population and labor force, relative to the rural 
population and labor force, has two potential reasons, namely differences in birth and 
mortality rates between rural and urban areas and/ or an increase of migration from 
rural to urban areas. This paper focuses on rural-urban migration and in this context it 
discusses both push and pull factors.  
 
 
1. Push factors 
 
The classical dual-economy models (e.g., Lewis 1954; Fei and Ranis 1964) 
explain rural-urban migration by increasing productivity in the agricultural sector 
which leads to a decreasing demand for agricultural workers and subsequently enables 
agricultural workers to migrate to non-agricultural sectors. But like a strong 
agricultural development, a weak agricultural development can also act as a push 
factor for rural-urban migration. If the agricultural sector fails to provide sufficient 
employment for a growing number of workers, and/ or if the agricultural sector fails 
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to provide sufficiently high household incomes to cope with a growing number of 
dependants, people can be encouraged to seek employment outside agriculture.  
Data of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations 
is showing that many African LDCs have land that could potentially be brought under 
cultivation (Herrmann 2007). But the notion of land abundance in countries of Africa 
must be qualified. It is one thing for countries to have an abundance of potentially 
arable land, but the quality of this land is another. According to FAO estimates there 
were a large number of African LDCs where the population was already living on and 
of fragile land, which is defined as land in arid regions, with steep slopes and fragile 
soils (UNCTAD 2006). Out of a sample of 31 African LDCs, for which data were 
available, there were 16 countries in which more than 30% of the population was 
living on fragile lands, and there were 8 countries in which more than 50% of the 
population was living on fragile lands in the mid-1990s. This situation has not 
significantly changed since, as indicated by (i) small and decreasing farm size per 
capita, (ii) low and often decreasing productivity of agricultural workers, and (iii) low 
and often decreasing yields per hectare. 
Table 2 shows that between 1980—1983 and 2000—2003 agricultural land 
per agricultural worker has remained constant or declined in 24 of the 33 African 
LDCs for which data is available. Over the same period, labor productivity of 
agricultural workers has decreased in no less than 7 of 22 African LDCs with 
available data.8 At the end of this period, African LDCs had an average farm size of 
about 1 hectare per agriculturalist. Furthermore, in comparison to more advanced 
developing countries the LDCs have seen a relatively small increase or even a 
decrease of yields per hectare for many agricultural goods. Between 1980--1983 and 
2000--2003 the LDCs recorded increasing yields per hectare only for tobacco, but 
decreasing yields for fiber and oil-bearing crops, as well as fruits and nuts, and sugar 
(UNCTAD 2006).  
Household surveys, which provide a more disaggregated picture, are showing 
considerable differences in the distribution of land between income groups (e.g., Jane 
et al. 2003), as well as differences in output per hectare between income groups (e.g., 
Ellis and Freeman 2004). The studies are painting a consistent picture in the sense that 
                                                 
8 The estimates of labor productivity in African LDCs are heavily constrained by the lack and quality of 
available data. For a detailed discussion of data and methodological issues, see Herrmann (2006) and 
UNCTAD (2006). 
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lower income groups have smaller plots of land and lower yields than higher income 
groups.9  Data for 2001 and 2002 are showing that in Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda 
the lower income quartiles had persistently lower average output than the next higher 
income quartile (Ellis and Freeman 2004).  
The low level of agricultural land and labor productivity in Africa is closely 
associated with the unfinished business of the Green Revolution on the continent. 
African LDCs continue to have very low levels of irrigation and fertilizer 
consumption, in comparison not only with more advanced developing countries but 
also with Asian LDCs. Between the 1960s and the period 2000—2003 the share of 
agricultural land under irrigation has remained constant at 7% in African LDCs but 
has increased from 10% to 30% in Asian LDCs, and the consumption of fertilizer 
relative to total agricultural land has increased from only 2% to 7% in African LDCs 
but has increased from 2% to 44% in Asian LDCs.10 African LDCs have also been 
importing and using fewer agricultural machines, including tractors, than Asian 
LDCs. Although the share of agriculture value added in total value added of the 
African LDCs has barely decreased since the early 1980s (from 34% to 33% of total 
value added), the share of agricultural machinery imports in total capital goods 
imports of African LDCs has almost decreased by half since the 1980s (from 3.7% to 
1.2% of capital goods imports) (UNCTAD 2006 and 2007). The declining imports of 
agricultural machinery have not been compensated by an increasing domestic 
production of agricultural machinery. Finally, following structural adjustment 
programmes which encouraged austere fiscal policies, many African countries have 
reduced their spending on agricultural research and development (Pardey and 
Beintema 2001), even though public investment in agricultural was found to have 
relatively high social returns and poverty-reduction effects (Fan et al. 2004 and 2005).  
The analyzed data is showing that while some African LDCs have scope to 
increase agricultural production by cultivating more land, many African LDCs are 
already reaching the frontier of arable land. The inability to significantly expand 
agricultural production means that an increasing share of the agricultural labor force 
in African LDCs will not be able to find productive employment in agriculture. At the 
                                                 
9 Jayne et al. (2003) are highlighting that in Ethiopia the lowest income quartile had access to only 0.03 
hectares/ capita, whereas the highest income quartile had access to 0.58 hectares, according to 1995 
data. The respective numbers for Mozambique are 0.10 and 1.16 (1996 data), Malawi 0.08 and 0.60 
(2000 data), Rwanda 0.02 and the 0.43 (2000 data), and Zambia 0.12 and 1.36 (2000 data).  
10 Estimates based on FAO, FAOSTAT online. 
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same time, the failure to significantly intensify agricultural production means that an 
increasing share of the rural populations in African LDCs can no longer live of 
agriculture. Because of the weak development of their agricultural sector, LDCs have 
a decreasing capacity to absorb the agricultural labor force in agricultural production. 
Chart 2 shows that in the LDCs a large additional increase of the agricultural labor 
has been associated with a marginal increase of agricultural labor productivity. By 
contrast, in developed countries a decrease of the agricultural labor force has been 
associated with an increase of agricultural labor productivity. Other developing 
countries fall between these extremes – they have seen a smaller increase of the 
agricultural labor force than the LDCs, but they also have had a smaller increase of 
agricultural labor productivity than the developed countries.11  
The relationship between changes in the agricultural labor force and the 
changes in agricultural labor productivity can work in both directions. While it is 
plausible that an increase of agricultural labor productivity allows for a decrease of 
the agricultural labor force, it is equally plausible that an increase of the agricultural 
labor force results in a decrease of agricultural labor productivity, particularly if the 
increase of the labor force is not matched by a concomitant increase of land, 
machinery, finance, seeds or fertilizers. Whereas the former line auf causality may 
reflect the situation in more advanced countries, the latter may have been important in 
the least developed countries, where the size of agricultural land per agriculturalist is 
small and declining, and the use of agricultural machinery continues to be very small 
as well. Indeed, the almost unlimited supply of cheap agricultural laborers itself may 
have discouraged increasing investment in agricultural machinery. The substitution of 
labor for capital however faces limits, especially if agricultural land is limited and 
agricultural inputs are not accessible or affordable. 
Unlike early formulations of dual economy models, which focused on a 
positive agricultural development as a precondition for rural-urban migration, this 
analysis of least developed countries suggests that negative agricultural development 
can be an equally powerful push-factor for rural-urban migration. This finding 
                                                 
11 The high and rapidly increasing labor productivity in agriculture of developed countries sheds doubt 
on the assumption that developing countries have a comparative advantage in agriculture. The 
increasing productivity gap in agriculture between the developed countries and the developing 
countries is attributable to the changing nature of agricultural production, namely a shift from labor-
intensive to capital-intensive and low-technology to high-technology. The changing nature of 
agriculture merits an in-depth analysis, as it has far-reaching implications for development trajectories 
and strategies.   
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however requires further qualifications. Whether people migrate from rural to urban 
areas depends not per se on whether the agricultural sector in specific is characterized 
by a good or bad development, but depends on whether the rural sector in general 
generates sufficient and sufficiently lucrative employment opportunities. While in 
practice rural economic activities are often synonymous with agricultural activities, 
for analytical purposes it is important to recognize that rural economic activities also 
include non-agricultural activities. Furthermore, agricultural- and non-agricultural 
activities in rural areas can reinforce each other. Just like a weak development of the 
agricultural sector can reinforce and can be reinforced by a weak development of rural 
industries, a strong development of the agricultural sector can be furthered by a strong 
development of off-farm enterprises, which provide inputs and services for 
agricultural producers or engaged in the processing of agricultural produce. 
Accordingly, a loss of employment due to growing productivity in agricultural may 
actually be offset by the creation of new employment opportunities in expanding off-
farm enterprises. The possibility of such favorable structural changes in rural areas is 
largely disregarded by simpler versions of the dual-economy model. As result, these 
models fail to recognize that strong development in the agricultural sector may in fact 
be a weaker push factor for rural-urban migration than a weak development in the 
agricultural sectors.  
In conclusion, a model with explanatory power beyond a specific context 
needs to realize that it is employment in the rural areas that ultimately determines 
migration to urban centers, and that the employment in rural areas depends as much 
on the development of the farm sectors as it depends on the development of the off-
farm sector. Furthermore, failure of the different rural sectors to generate sufficient 
and sufficiently lucrative employment can be due to a positive development, which is 
associated with increasing agricultural productivity, or a negative development, which 
is associated with limited agricultural production. Although it is important to realize 
the complex interactions between push factors for rural-urban migration, it remains a 
relatively straight forward exercise to identify the principle push factors in the least 
developed countries. Given that the rural economic activities in the African LDCs are 
largely determined by agricultural activities, it is essentially the weak agricultural 
development in the African LDCs that encourages rural-urban migration. The weak 
development in the farm sector is complemented by a weak development in off-farm 
industries, and low levels of labor absorption.  
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2. Pull factors. 
 
Although the push factors are important for an understanding of rural-urban 
migration equally important are the pull factors. In line with earlier structuralist 
models we argue that rural-urban migration is motivated by wage differentials. But it 
is important to specify that the wage differentials between rural and urban areas can 
be perceived as well as real, and that the higher wage levels in urban areas are often 
unattainable in practice.  Following Herrmann (2006) we estimate differences in 
potential earnings between the agricultural sector/ rural areas and the non-agricultural 
sector/ urban areas by differences in labor productivity.  
Chart 3 shows an increasing divergence of labor productivity between 
different groups of countries since the early 1980s. In 2000—2003 it required, on 
average, 5 workers in an LDCs to produce what 1 worked produced in a more 
advanced developing country, and no less than 94 workers in an LDCs to produce 
what 1 worker produced in a developed country. These differences in labor 
productivity and the associated differences in potential earnings help to explain the 
increase of international migration from poor countries to more advanced countries. 
Similarly, the differences in agricultural and non-agricultural labor productivity 
within the LDCs help to explain the increase of migration from rural to urban areas in 
the LDCs themselves.  
The chart shows that the LDC group has recorded a decrease of non-
agricultural labor productivity and an increase of agricultural labor productivity over 
the period 1983—2003. Yet, despite the decrease of non-agricultural labor 
productivity, the level of non-agricultural labor productivity remains relatively high 
(see table 2). Herrmann (2006) estimates that non-agricultural labor productivity of 
the LDC group is about four times as high as agricultural labor productivity, and that 
non-agricultural labor productivity of African LDCs is almost seven-times as high as 
their agricultural labor productivity in the period 2000—2003. The differences 
between the two groups of LDCs are largely influenced by differences in agricultural 
labor productivity. During the period, the average annual agricultural labor 
productivity in African LDCs was USD 243, compared with USD 572 in Asian 
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LDCs, whereas the average non-agricultural labor productivity in African LDCs was 
USD 1643, compared with USD 2507 in Asian LDCs.12  
The difference in earning potential between agriculture and non-agricultural 
sectors is the principle pull factor for an increasing migration from rural to urban 
areas. But many people who migrate to urban areas will not be able to find a well 
paying job in the non-agricultural sector (Khan 1983, 1985, 2004, 2006; Stifel and 
Thorbecke 2003). Because of the shortage of formal-sector jobs – be it in industry or 
services – the majority of urban populations will be more likely to end up working as 
shoes shiners at a street corner rather than a regular employee of a textile enterprise, 
for example.  
 
 
D. Rapid urbanization, employment crisis and poverty 
 
Today many African LDCs have lower labor productivity than in the early 
1980s. Agricultural labor productivity has declined in about 1/3 of the African LDCs 
and non-agricultural labor productivity has fallen in more than 4/5 of African LDCs 
for which data was available (see table 2). The decrease of labor productivity 
indicates the degree of underemployment. In the poorest countries which provide 
virtually no unemployment benefits, unemployment is not a viable option. Therefore 
many of the formally unemployed will seek informal employment. Informal 
employment is characterized by unstable jobs, low productivity and minimal wages, 
which is symptomatic for underemployment.   
The finding that labor productivity in non-agricultural sector has decreased, 
which is another way of saying that underemployment in the non-agricultural sector 
has increased, is confirmed by case study evidence. Kingdon, Sandefur and Teal 
(2005) are showing that that in Tanzania the labor fore in non-agricultural has grown 
from 2.26 million but wage employment outside agriculture has grown by only 172 
thousand between 1990/1991 and 2000/2001. This finding is being confirmed by a 
recent labor market survey of selected African capitals  – Cotonou (Benin), 
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Bamako (Mali) and Dakar (Senegal) – which has 
                                                 
12 These estimates are based on an average of 28 African LDCs (excluding Angola and Equatorial 
Guinea which are the two main oil exporters in this group) and an average of 10 Asian LDCs 
(excluding Yemen which is the larges oil exporter in the region).  
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illustrated that on average 15% of the urban population has been unemployed and 
68% of the urban population has been unemployed or underemployed (Brilleau, 
Roubaud and Torelli 2005). The inability to find employment in the formal sector 
encourages people to assume employment in the informal sector. Brilleau, Roubaud 
and Torelli (2005) are showing that about 77% of the labor force in the before 
mentioned capitals has been employed in informal private enterprises. Furthermore, 
Charmes (2002) has estimated that about 93% of new employment opportunities in 
Sub-Saharan Africa have been in the informal sector.  
Table 3, which is drawing on case studies of selected African LDC, is 
underlining the importance of the informal sector. In the countries under 
consideration, the informal sector is employing between 58% and 93% of the non-
agricultural labor force and is contributing to between 20% and 59% of the non-
agricultural GDP. While the informal sector fulfills an important function by 
providing employment to people who would face unemployment otherwise, the 
informal sector should not be mystified as a viable social safety net. The imputed 
labor productivity gaps in the table 3 are showing that the productivity of the non-
agricultural informal sector have been only about 7.5% of the labor productivity in the 
non-agricultural formal sector. The potential wages that can be paid in the informal 
enterprises of the non-agricultural sector are correspondingly smaller than the 
potential wages that can be paid in the formal enterprises of the sector.13 Although 
these are estimates, the data is clearly showing that a considerable productivity 
difference and a wage difference between formal and informal activities in urban 
areas. This difference provides a possible incentive for reverse migration from urban 
to rural areas. In other words, people who migrate from rural of urban areas, but are 
unable to find a formal sector job in non-agriculture, may have an incentive to migrate 
back to the rural areas an assume a job in the agricultural sector. Employment in the 
informal sector however is not only associated with lower productivity and wages, it 
is often also associated with less stable employment and more hazardous employment 
conditions.14  
                                                 
13 Following Brilleau, Roubaud and Torelli (2005), the differences in pay between informal and formal 
enterprises in urban centers are smaller. They find that in the period 2000--2001 in Cotonou, 
Ouagadougou, Bamako and Dakar the average annual pay was about CFA 31 in informal private 
enterprises, compared with CFA 86 in formal private enterprises, CFA 124 in public enterprises, and 
CFA 106 in public administration. In accordance, the pay in informal enterprises was about 29% of the 
average pay in formal enterprises. 
14 For a more positive view on the informal sector as a safety net, see for example Hope (1999). 
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In sum, LDCs are affected by rapid urbanization, and rapid urbanization in the 
LDCs is leading to massive un- and underemployment, which is associated with low 
household incomes and widespread poverty. While extreme poverty – measured by $1 
per person and day adjusted for purchasing power parities (PPP) – remains higher in 
rural areas than in urban areas, the declining labor productivity in the non-agricultural 
sector suggests that poverty is increasing in the urban areas as well. Ravallion, Chen 
and Sangraula (2007) have estimated that the urban poor in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
increased from 24% to 30% of the total poor in the region between 1993 and 2002. 
But the relative increase of the urban poor has not been associated with a decrease of 
the rural poor. As a result, by 2002 Sub-Saharan Africa did not only have more poor 
in the urban areas but also had more poor in the rural areas, compared with 1993. This 
development stands in marked contrast to other regions.15 Thus some of the 
predictions of our dual-dual model are empirically confirmed. 
 
E. Policy implications of rapid urbanization 
 
Dijk (2006) has described urbanization – the agglomeration of households in 
confined space – in terms of a U-shaped curve. Initially rapid urbanization is 
associated with considerable challenges and costs, but if managed successfully these 
costs can be turned into opportunities and benefits. However, as our theoretical 
discussion of the dual-dual model of urbanization and the persistence of informal 
sectors and the empirical evidence we provide in this paper demonstrate, this turn-
around – which is associated with economies of scale and an increase of economic 
and ecological efficiency, among others – is not an automatic process (UN-HABITAT 
2007). It requires a sound public management of urban agglomerations and, all else 
equal, this depends on a vibrant economy in and around urban centers. A growing 
urban economy must ensure sufficient revenues for urban authorities, and it must 
create sufficient jobs for the urban population. Otherwise, urban centers will be 
confronted by a spread of poverty and slums, social exclusion and crime (UN-
HABITAT 2007), and the urban authorities will lack revenues to finance necessary 
                                                 
15 While the increase of poverty in Africa that is indicated by household-survey based poverty 
estimates, which are available for only few LDCs, is consistent with national-accounts based poverty 
estimates, which can be constructed for most of the LDCs. But although the trends in poverty are 
similar, the levels of poverty diverge. For a discussion of the differences between the two types of 
poverty estimates for low-income countries, see UNCTAD (2002), Karshenas (2001) and Deaton 
(2001).  
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interventions and investment, including investment in housing, water, sanitation, 
electricity, waste management, transport, schools and health care facilities, as well as 
spending on welfare programmes, and law and order.   
The data examined in this paper is showing that urban centers in African 
LDCs are witnessing a large influx of people, but that the cities in most African LDCs 
are suffering from a lack of jobs. Urban centers continue to be characterized by a 
rapid increase of un- and underemployment, and associated with this a rapid increase 
of poverty and slums. To use the picture of the u-shaped curve of urban development, 
many cities are at the downward slope and the challenge is to encourage a transition 
to the upward slope. Although this transition requires a better management of urban 
centers, it goes well beyond a narrow focus on the urban centers alone. It is important 
that the anti-urban bias, which has characterized development efforts in recent years, 
is not replaced by an anti-rural bias in the years to come.16 Indeed, we are arguing that 
successful urban development is closely linked to and cannot be separated from 
successful rural development. In accordance, we are encouraging development 
policies to focus on the strengthening of three linkages between informal and formal 
enterprises in the urban areas, linkages between small-scale farms and large 
commercial farms in the rural areas, and finally linkages between farms and firms 
across geographic locations. The strengthening of these linkages is a complex 
challenge that cannot be adequately addressed in this paper. It is possible however to 
outline the necessary directions and changes of current development policies.  
The principal objective of development policies, as well as related efforts to 
sustainably reduce poverty, should be to increase the absorption of the labor force by 
creating more and more productive employment opportunities, which generate 
sufficiently high household incomes (UNCTAD 2006; Hope 1999). The creation of 
employment opportunities in rural areas is necessary to decrease migration to urban 
centers, whereas the creation of employment opportunities in urban centers is 
important to address the downsides of rapid urbanization.  
The creation of more and more productive employment opportunities requires 
the development of productive capacities across sectors and industries. According to 
UNCTAD (2006) the development of productive capacities requires a strengthening 
                                                 
16 Lipton (1977) argued that development policies should focus on the rural rather than the urban areas, 
as the rural areas constitute the backbone of developing economies and home to the majority of the 
poor. In recent years, development and poverty reduction efforts have therefore underlined the 
importance of rural and especially agricultural development.  
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of production linkages (between enterprises and sectors), a strengthening of 
productive resources (factors of production), and a strengthening of entrepreneurial 
capabilities (managerial, technical and technological skills). Entrepreneurial 
capabilities can be thought of as the necessary capabilities to effectively use the 
factors of production in order to convert raw inputs into competitive outputs (see also 
Gore and Herrmann 2008a).  
Furthermore, the development of productive investment requires public and 
private investment in physical and social infrastructure, as well as a strengthening of 
institutions. While developing countries and their development partners are placing 
increasing focus on strengthening public institutions – as reflected, for example, by a 
considerable increase of aid for governance-related purposes – it is equally necessary 
to think of possibilities to strengthen private-sector support institutions. These include 
private financial intermediaries, agencies for investment and trade promotion, 
chambers of industry and commerce, and producer associations, but they also include 
public development banks, marketing boards and caisse de stabilisation (see e.g. 
UNCTAD 2008). The latter have been weakened or closed during structural 
adjustment programmes. While it is important to recognize that many of these 
institutions suffered from corruption and inefficiencies, it is equally important to 
recognize that these institutions held important functions in developing economies. 
The institutional void that resulted from the dismantling of such institutions was not, 
contrary to the expectations of the reformers, filled by private sector initiatives. It is 
therefore necessary to rebuild such institutions, while taking account of past 
experiences. Enterprises in the least developed countries in particular require public or 
public-private institutions that are supporting innovations and providing help with 
respects to new technologies and diversification, storage and shipment, finance and 
insurance, as well as market intelligence and marketing.   
Despite the need for productive sector development, productive sector 
development does not receive adequate attention. In recent years, official 
development assistance (ODA) committed to LDCs was characterized by two 
important shifts. The first is a shift in overall aid from development-oriented aid to 
emergency assistance; the second is a shift in development-oriented aid from 
economic infrastructure and production to social infrastructure and governance-
related matters (UNCTAD 2006, 2007, 2008). These trends can negatively affect the 
economic development of LDCs and lead to even more “fire-fighting” in the LDCs in 
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the future. Between 1998--2000 and 2003—2005 aid commitments for social 
infrastructure and governance increased from 8.8% to 11.3% of total aid 
commitments – mostly due to an increase of aid for government and civil society – 
whereas aid commitments for economic infrastructure and production decreased from 
3% to 2.4% of total aid commitments (UNCTAD 2007). Although aid for the social 
sector and governance-related matters can be used to enhance capabilities and hence 
future productivity, it requires careful planning and development of institutions. What 
is crucial is to provide adequate development-oriented aid to properly motivated 
recipient policy makers (Khan 2002, 2003, 2004c; Gang and Khan 1999). 
The agricultural sector is particularly hard hit by the decline of aid in the 
productive sector more generally. Between 1998--2000 and 2003--2005 aid for 
agricultural research, extension and education has decreased from about 0.7% to 0.1% 
of total aid commitments. The aid committed to agriculture is little in absolute terms, 
but it is even smaller, if compared against the fact that agricultural sector continues to 
account for about 1/3 of the LDCs’ GDP, and that the rural areas continue to host 
about 3/4 of the LDCs’ population in 2000--2003. Furthermore, the decline of aid for 
agricultural development in LDCs rests uneasy with the finding that agricultural 
investment in LDCs – particularly investment in agricultural research and 
development, and investment in rural infrastructure, including feeder roads – is 
characterized by relatively high social rates of return (Fan et al. 2004 and 2005). The 
decline of aid for agricultural development is paralleled by a slight increase of aid for 
industrial research and development, from USD 1.3 million in 1998—2000 to USD 
6.7 million in 2003-2005, in real terms. But measured as a share of total aid 
commitments, the aid commitments for industrial research and development remained 
low, accounting for less than 0.0% of the total in the latter period (UNCTAD 2007).17  
Like foreign aid for agriculture, domestic investment in agriculture also 
declined in many LDCs between the 1980s and 1990s. Over this period, public 
investment in agricultural research and development is declining in 8 of 13 African 
LDCs for which data were available, while private investment in agricultural research 
                                                 
17 UNCTAD (2007), as well as Gore and Herrmann (2008b) show that contrary to what the common 
believe may be, investment in science, technology and innovation is important even in LDC-type 
economies. These economies however do not require foundation research that pushes the global 
technology and knowledge frontier, they require rather applied research and development which helps 
in very concrete ways to improve production processes and products. 
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and development has remained small.18 Beintema and Stads (2006) have estimated 
that private investment in agricultural research and development accounted for only 
2% of the total investment in agricultural research and development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2000. 
In sum, the development of productive capacities, which is a precondition for 
the creation of productive employment opportunities, is a central element of viable 
poverty reduction strategies, as well as viable urbanization. African LDCs should 
develop a corresponding focus in their development strategies, and their donors, 
especially the OECD/ DAC countries, should provide the necessary financial backing 
for these strategies. It is necessary to reverse the trends in aid, and to provide a much 
larger share of aid for productive sector development, including the development of 
rural and urban areas, and the development of agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors. Although urban centers mostly host non-agricultural industries, sustainable 
urbanization also strongly depends on what happens in the agricultural sectors. 
Productive employment opportunities in rural areas are important in order to combat 
an unsustainable migration from rural to urban areas, and productive employment 
opportunities in urban centers are essential to absorb the rapidly increasing labor force 
in the non-agricultural sector.  
Only if urban populations find productive employment will they benefit from 
rising household incomes. Only then will they be able to move out of slums, afford 
better access to water and sanitation, better access to health care and schools and live 
in a safe environment free from crime in the urban centers. In Sen's terminology, the 
capabilities enhancement for the urban poor in LDCs are intimately connected with 
both the means and the ends of development in our suggested strategy.  
 
                                                 
18 Estimates based on ASTI CIGAR online. 
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Appendix:  
Formal Representation of Dual-Dual Model 
 
For the interested reader, the formal representation of the dual-dual model 
with Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) Production Functions is given below. 
The readers interested in following the equations in detail are referred to section 4 
“Notation and symbol explanation” below, which describes the model in greater 
depth. 
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Equilibrium Conditions 
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The production sectors are specified as CES with the choice of nonunitary19 
elasticities of substitution for the two formal sector commodities in equations 1 and 2. 
The informal sector commodities also have CES specifications. All commodities are 
produced under capital constraints. Thus, capital, K, in each sector has an upper 
bound denoted by a bar above K. The assumption that capital stock is fixed in each 
sector may be relaxed, but it is in fact, a fairly standard assumption for developing 
economies. 
 In the informal sectors each worker receives her average revenue product. 
Rural small holders may work on common land and these rural farming households 
may share the total income equally among all the family members. Urban informal 
workers supply all their labor at the prevailing wage rate. Thus leisure is not an 
argument in their objective function. This may be defended as an extreme assumption 
when people are at the margins of subsistence. Equations 5 and 6 show the informal 
sectors’ income determination. 
 The total income per unit includes logically the returns also to non-labor assets 
for those who own land or capital. Hence, the relevant measure of income is total 
income per unit from all sources. 
The profit maximizing rural large landholders ensure that under competitive 
conditions wages for unskilled workers in the export sector are equal to the marginal 
revenue product of the unskilled labor they have to hire. Equation 7 reflects this 
condition. Equation 8 shows the equilibrium allocation of unskilled labor in the rural 
                                                 
19 The Stifel-Thorbecke paper uses Cobb-Douglas production functions with elasticities of substitution 
restricted to a value of 1. 
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informal sector. In equilibrium, the rural sector wage rate is below the wage rate in the 
formal sector by a fixed factor. This reflects the assumption that there are transactions 
costs in working in the rural formal sector that is captured by this mark up.20 
 Turning now to the import sector, for unskilled workers in the urban area the 
assumption here is that they get the income per unit of labor in the urban services 
sector (shown in equation 9) plus a share of the profits as given in equation 10. The 
profit determination itself is shown in equation 11.  
The Harris-Todaro model features regarding rural-urban migration are 
captured in equation 12. Here, in equilibrium, rural wage must equal the expected 
wage in the urban sector. In equation 12, the probability of getting a job in the import 
sector is given by the share of the urban uneducated labor force in that  particular 
sector multiplied by a scale parameter, h. 
 Skilled workers are employed only in the formal sectors. Their wages are 
determined in equations 13 and 14 by their marginal revenue products. We now turn 
to the determination of incomes for the households. 
 
 
1. Household Income Determination 
 
There are nine types of households. Two in the rural area are landowning 
households -- large and small. There are also urban capitalists and bureaucrats. The 
other five are households where the main source of income is from labor. 
The rural informal households which are really rural small holders receive 
their total revenue from production as shown in equation 16. Rural unskilled and 
skilled households receive their wage incomes as shown in equations 17 and 18 
respectively. Equation 19 gives the incomes of the rural large land holders. 
Equations 20- 24 show the incomes of the urban households. The working 
class households receive wage income and the capitalists the profit incomes, in 
general. The bureaucratic households capture part of the rents from imports by 
                                                 
20 Alternatively, one could also postulate that there is an ‘insider’ market wage equilibrium in the 
formal sector, and those unskilled workers lucky enough (or more likely, because they know someone 
already working in the formal sector) to get a job in the formal sector can enjoy this wage premium. 
This is not a hypothesis the authors consider, but the data will be consistent with this hypothesis as 
well. 
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colluding with the rent seekers.21 The formal sector employers (rural large land 
owners and urban capitalists) are the only savers in the model. They each save a 
constant fraction of their nominal incomes. 
Household demand functions are captured by maximization of Cobb-Douglas 
utility functions subject to their income constraints. There are 23 such equations 
(equations 27-49) because the four rural household groups have access to only food 
and importables. This gives us eight equations. Each of the urban groups has access to 
three commodities--- food, importables and urban services. This gives another 15 
equations. The prices for the three commodities can be used to define an overall 
deflator. 
 
 
2. Foreign Trade 
 
Imports in this model are the difference between domestic demand and 
production of import competing sector. Exports can be supplied at the prevailing price 
up to any quantity under the small country assumption. Thus exports are equal to total 
output less the savings in the form of exportables of the rural large landholders. 
Equations 50 and 51 show the import and export demand functions respectively. 
 
 
3. Equilibrium conditions for the model as a whole and Causal Depth 
 
There are two sets of equilibrium conditions in the model. First, the labor 
market equilibrium conditions are given by equations 52 and 53. There is disguised 
unemployment, as discussed before, but no formal involuntary unemployment. The 
second set of equilibrium conditions given by equations 50 and 51 is that the domestic 
demand for the informal sector goods and services is matched by domestic supply. 
Prices in the formal sectors are set by the world market prices. The export price is 
normalized to one. The import price is equal to 1+t, where t is the tariff rate. 
Exchange rate is held fixed during the particular modelling period. It is clear that the 
current account balance must be exogenous. This balance is equal to foreign savings 
                                                 
21 Salaries are excluded in equation 24. The reasoning is that these are invariant to exogenous shocks. 
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which are assumed to be zero here. Hence current account balance is assumed to be 
zero.22 This completes the description of the formal model. It is clear that this model 
has greater causal depth than the standard neoclassical optimizing model since the 
households and firms can optimize here but within a deeper socio-economic structure. 
In addition to the standard explananda common to the concerns of the two rival 
models, these structural features allow the social scientist to explain other phenomena 
such as poverty, migration and their interactions among other things.  
 
4. Notation and symbol explanation 
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Eqn 1-2: output of formal sector [superscript/subscript; fc=formal sector 
commodities] 
X=output in formal sector; A=Technology coefficient; K=Fixed capital; β=share of 
input in output; LS= skilled labor; LU=unskilled labor; μ=elasticity of substitution; 
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Eqn 3-4: output in informal sector [superscript/subscript; ic=informal sector 
commodities] 
X=output in formal sector; A=Technology coefficient; K=Fixed capital; β=share of 
input in output; LS= skilled labor; LU=unskilled labor; μ=elasticity of substitution; 
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22 Implicitly, this amounts to claiming for a reforming economy(see section 5 above) that the 
stabilization policies indeed succeed in restoring the external balance. 
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wsfc= skilled wage in formal sector 
)15......(..........
)1()1(
1 1
1
exim
LU
im
LU
im
LU
im wsws
θ
βθβθ
β −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−
−=  
wsim= skilled wage in import competing sector; θ= relative risk aversion of skilled 
workers 
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Disposable income and savings 
)16......(..........foodfoodrih LUiI =  
Irih= disposable income of rural informal household 
)17......(..........exexruh LUwuI =  
Iruh= disposable income of rural unskilled household 
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Irsh= disposable income of rural skilled household 
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Irlh= disposable income of rural large landholders household 
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Iuih= disposable income of urban informal household 
)21......(..........imimuuh LUwsI =  
Iuuh= disposable income of rural unskilled household 
)22......(..........imimush LSwsI =  
Iush= disposable income of urban unskilled household 
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Iukh= disposable income of urban capitalist household 
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Ibch= disposable income of bureaucrat household 
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S=savings of formal sector employers (urban capitalists and rural large landholders) 
Demand 
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α=budget share of commodities; I=household income; C=consumption of 
commodities by households; P=price of commidites; 
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Chart 1: Changing location of population and labor force
in African LDCs, 1950-2010
Source: Estimates base on FAO, FAOSTAT, online.
 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1990-
2000
2000-
2010
Total population 109 136 175 231 308 401 518 94 117
Rural areas 101 122 150 189 240 294 350 54 56
Urban areas 8 14 25 42 67 107 168 40 61
Total labor force 57 69 86 109 142 183 238 42 55
Agriculture 52 61 74 90 113 139 169 26 30
Non-agriculture 5 8 12 19 28 44 69 16 25
Table 1: Changing size and locus of population and labor force in African LDCs, 1950-2010
(Million)
Change
Source: Estimates based on FAO, FAOSTAT, online.
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1980-
1983
2000-
2003
% 
change
1980-
1983
2000-
2003
% 
change
1980-
1983
2000-
2003
% 
change
1980-
1983
2000-
2003
% 
change
1980-
1983
2000-
2003
% 
change
Angola 10.2 6.3 -37.6 76.1 71.5 -6.1 1.2 0.8 -34.8 .. 148 .. .. .. ..
Benin 25.2 36.2 43.5 66.7 52.5 -21.3 1.4 1.8 26.7 264 572 116.9 .. .. ..
Burkina Faso 32.3 31.7 -2.1 92.2 92.2 0.0 0.8 0.8 1.5 128 165 28.5 2871 3919 36.5
Burundi 52.4 49.5 -5.6 92.7 90.1 -2.8 0.6 0.4 -23.5 118 104 -11.8 1316 958 -27.2
Cape Verde 16.4 11.5 -29.6 35.7 22.1 -38.1 1.2 1.2 4.2 .. 1630 .. .. .. ..
Central African Republic 43.4 58.7 35.2 84.0 71.4 -15.1 1.9 1.6 -14.9 281 400 42.3 1933 691 -64.3
Chad 40.0 37.8 -5.4 87.2 73.8 -15.4 1.6 1.3 -19.7 151 214 42.5 1532 1000 -34.7
Comoros 26.6 45.7 72.2 80.2 73.0 -9.0 0.6 0.5 -19.5 305 367 20.4 .. 1025 ..
Congo DR 29.0 61.9 113.8 71.1 62.5 -12.1 0.8 0.6 -29.8 221 198 -10.3 1256 195 -84.5
Djibouti .. 3.7 .. 84.2 78.0 -7.4 0.0 0.0 -45.3 .. 69 .. .. 6298 ..
Equatorial Guinea 55.0 6.3 -88.6 78.0 69.7 -10.5 2.7 1.7 -38.5 .. 712 .. .. 24086 ..
Eritrea .. 15.0 .. .. 77.1 .. .. 0.4 .. .. 63 .. .. 1211 ..
Ethiopia 59.5 46.9 -21.1 .. 81.7 .. .. 0.5 .. .. 123 .. .. 622 ..
Gambia 39.3 32.3 -17.6 84.1 78.5 -6.6 0.6 0.6 -6.3 290 233 -19.7 2349 1784 -24.1
Guinea 23.0 23.9 3.8 90.3 83.3 -7.8 0.5 0.5 -4.0 .. 221 .. .. 3499 ..
Guinea-Bissau 47.9 57.2 19.5 87.2 82.4 -5.4 1.0 1.1 13.3 185 249 34.6 .. 873 ..
Lesotho 27.4 17.4 -36.4 41.5 38.9 -6.3 1.4 1.2 -12.3 452 509 12.8 875 1533 75.3
Liberia .. .. .. 76.0 66.9 -12.0 1.0 0.7 -22.3 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Madagascar 27.3 30.0 9.7 81.0 73.6 -9.2 0.8 0.6 -26.2 181 177 -2.2 2043 1156 -43.4
Malawi 29.7 37.1 24.9 87.2 82.3 -5.5 0.6 0.5 -13.1 89 122 36.7 1435 965 -32.7
Maldives .. .. .. 47.6 21.1 -55.6 0.2 0.4 95.1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mali 44.3 41.4 -6.6 88.5 80.1 -9.4 0.6 1.0 62.0 172 223 29.3 1664 1274 -23.5
Mauritania 24.0 20.5 -14.5 69.0 52.5 -23.9 0.4 0.8 72.9 207 283 36.8 1465 1219 -16.8
Mozambique 31.7 27.0 -14.8 84.2 80.9 -3.9 0.6 0.6 0.5 .. 133 .. .. 1542 ..
Niger 31.7 39.3 24.1 91.1 87.4 -4.0 3.9 3.2 -18.4 189 168 -11.0 3863 1727 -55.3
Rwanda 35.2 42.7 21.3 92.6 90.6 -2.2 0.4 0.3 -19.1 220 220 0.0 4250 2439 -42.6
Sao Tome and Principe .. 20.0 .. 74.0 62.7 -15.3 1.2 1.2 3.8 .. 223 .. .. 1639 ..
Senegal 23.4 18.1 -22.7 80.2 73.3 -8.6 1.1 0.8 -30.1 275 264 -4.1 3122 2885 -7.6
Sierra Leone 54.1 46.9 -13.4 69.4 61.4 -11.5 0.6 0.6 -3.6 532 282 -46.9 910 507 -44.3
Somalia .. .. .. 77.9 70.5 -9.5 0.4 0.4 -11.5 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sudan 36.0 41.1 14.2 71.8 59.7 -16.8 2.3 2.2 -5.5 378 680 79.7 1633 1434 -12.2
Tanzania UR .. 44.5 .. 85.6 79.8 -6.7 1.0 0.8 -23.8 .. 278 .. .. 1371 ..
Togo 22.9 34.9 52.6 68.3 58.8 -13.9 0.5 0.3 -26.2 275 402 46.2 1583 937 -40.8
Uganda 51.5 36.1 -29.9 86.7 79.4 -8.4 2.6 2.2 -15.9 202 228 12.8 1307 1547 18.3
Zambia 14.9 20.5 37.5 75.7 68.4 -9.6 2.5 1.7 -31.8 185 207 11.7 3362 1743 -48.2
(non-agricultural value 
addes/ non-agricultural 
labor force)
Memo:
(% total value added) (% total labor force) (hectare/ agricultural worker)
(agricultural value added/ 
agricultural labor force)
Agricultural land/ 
labor ratio
Non-agricultural 
labor productivity
Agricultural labor 
force
Agriculture value 
added
Agricultural labor 
productivity
Table 2: Agriculture in African LDCs, 1980-1983 and 2000-2003
Source: Estimates based on World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-ROM; and FAO, FAOSTAT online.
Note: (a) Value added data are in constant 2000 dollars. (b) Labor force is the economically active population. (c) Other LDCs include 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, Samoa, Soloman Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, 
vanuatu and Yemen in Asia, as well as Haiti in the Americas.  
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Source: Herrmann (2006). 
y = 0.0081x2 - 1.121x + 49.694
R2 = 0.5393
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Chart 2: Change of labor force and labor productivity in agriculture 
in LDCs, other developing countries and developed countries 
between 1980-1983 and 2000-2003
 
Chart 3: Change of labor productivity in agriculture and non-agriculture in LDCs, other developing countries and developed 
countries between 1983-2003
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Source: Estimates based on World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-Rom; and FAO, FAOSTAT online.  
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Memo:
Year of estimate
Share of 
informal 
employment in 
total non-
agricultural 
employment
Contribution of 
informal sector 
to non-
agricultural 
GDP
Imputed labor 
productivity 
gapa
Benin 1993 93 43 17.0
Burkina Faso 1992 77 .. 6.0
Chad 1993 74 45 3.6
Guinea 1994-2000 72 .. ..
Mali 1989 79 42 5.1
Mauritania 1989 75 14 18.6
Mozambique 1994 74 45 3.5
Niger 1995 .. 59 ..
Tanzania 1991 .. 43 ..
Senegal 1991 76 41 4.5
Zambia 1998 58 20 1.9
Table 3: Contribution of informal sector to non-agricultural employment and GDP in 
selected LDCs (%)
Source: UNCTAD 2006: 184.
a The imputed labor productivity gap is estimated by dividing the formal sector GDP per formal 
sector worker by the informal sector GDP per informal sector worker.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
